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The wider project from which this research stems examines the intersections of race, 
gender and national identity in Ecuador in the early-to-mid twentieth century, using the state and 
the process of state formation as the key locus of analysis. The expansion of public health and 
sanitation was central to this process of modernization in Ecuador. During the period under 
review, the tropical coastal and Amazonian regions were being spatially integrated into the 
nation for the first time through infrastructure projects such as the Quito-Guayaquil Railroad and 
the creation of a highway from the highlands to the Amazon, while the exploitation of the raw 
materials (including oil, gold, ivory-nut and rubber) that lay in these regions was imperative to 
elite goals of economic modernization and full national integration into the world economy. Yet 
these zones were plagued by diseases like yellow fever and malaria which discouraged both the 
migration of labor and the penetration of foreign capital.   
Health and sanitation are essential to an analysis of race and gender because they were at 
the heart of state efforts to “uplift” the living standard of racial subalterns and to transform the 
role of women in society.  At the turn of the twentieth century, approximately forty percent of 
the population was characterized as of indigenous descent, while a further ten percent was black 
or mulatto. Elites increasingly recognized (in no small part because of popular pressure from 
below) that black and indigenous groups could not continue to simply be excluded from the 
nation, and began to debate whether they could be “improved” enough to become useful citizens. 
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Indians in particular were characterized as “dirty” and unhygienic and were blamed for the 
spread disease, especially the cholera and bubonic plague epidemics that occurred in the 1920s 
and 1930s; yet they were also seen as “transformable” through targeted application of social 
policy in the fields of education and sanitation.
1
 Women’s relationship to the state was under 
similar negotiation. The idea that women were “naturally” religious and politically conservative 
led to the intense politicization of women’s roles by rival liberal and conservative groups in this 
era, and in 1929 Ecuador became the first Latin American country to extend the right to vote to 
women, in an effort by the then in power conservative government, to consolidate their support 
base. The idea of the home became a dominant trope of discourses of modernization, and as 
elsewhere in Latin America this was translated into state policy through educational initiatives 
centered on puericulture and domestic hygiene.
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Yet despite these ambitious aspirations, limited fiscal resources meant that the state 
lacked the economic capacity to achieve its social policy goals and so was forced to rely on 
proxies and intermediaries. In the field of education Jesuit, Dominican and North American 
Protestant missionaries largely fulfilled this role, dominating the provision of rural schooling. In 
the realm of health and sanitation the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) became an important actor, 
most notably leading the campaign to eradicate yellow fever in the port city of Guayaquil that 
was so central to Ecuador’s integration into the global economy. The RF also supported other 
smaller public health initiatives, and spearheaded the expanded training of medical personnel.  
In this research report, I will examine the ways in which the RF actions and inactions 
shaped the gendering and racialization of the Ecuadorian state’s modernization process and 
assess the meaning of this in order to understand the international currents that shaped domestic  
state building in the Andes.  
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Race, Ethnicity and the Spacialization of Rockefeller Foundation Policy  
Ideas about race and transformability profoundly impacted the state allocation of 
resources and the public health priorities of the Ecuadorian government. Social policy efforts 
were concentrated on large urban centers and in the countryside, and were restricted to those 
groups perceived to be most capable of making the behavioral shifts necessary to become 
respectable citizens—notably highland Indians. Amazonian development was largely outsourced 
to foreign corporate interests and missionaries, while social provision in the mainly black coastal 
province of Esmeraldas was neglected almost entirely.
3
 This reflected ideas about national 
priorities, and served to shape a sliding scale of national inclusion that ranked the capacities and 
potentialities of different ethnic groups.  
Many of the ideas and assumptions of the Ecuadorian state about the inferiority and 
problematic nature of particular races were shared by RF policy makers. This should not be 
surprising: race and racial ideologies operated in the early twentieth century as international 
discourses, and were shared and reinterpreted across the Americas. In a 1947 visit to a rural 
teacher training school near Tambillo, in the highlands of Ecuador, RF representative  
E.C. Stakman manifested a strongly racialized contempt for efforts to teach academic subjects to 
indigenous people. “Most of the students are Indians. The spectacle of an Indian girl trying to 
explain a problem in algebra, when it was evident that she had memorized without being capable 
of understanding, was a conspicuous example of misdirected effort.” 4 On other occasions the 
disparagement of indigenous people was more opaque, but equally telling. In a 1940 report on 
living conditions in Ecuador, aimed at recruiting teachers for the proposed American School in 
Quito, the RF representative listed the observation of Indians as an amusing pastime, noting in a 
section headed “hobbies,” that alongside a variety of plant and animal life:  “The Indian, a source 
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of anthropological and sociological study, is at one’s very door in Quito.”5 The invisibilization of 
blacks was taken to extremes in RF demographic descriptions. A Survey of Medical Education in 
Ecuador produced by J. H. Bauer in Lima in 1952, described the national population to be 
“distributed racially as follows: whites, 8%; mestizos 38%; and pure Indians 54%;” totally 
discounting the substantial black population.
6
   
Racial ideas impacted the way in which disease vectors were labeled and discussed by RF 
officials. This can be seen most tellingly in the aftermath of the successful campaign to eradicate 
yellow fever in the important port city of Guayaquil from 1916-1918, when there was extensive  
discussion about the migration of highland laborers and their mutual congregation as a major 
source of yellow fever infection.
7
  “Serranos,” as people from the highlands were termed by RF 
officials (adopting the usage common in Guayaquil) were less likely than people from the coast 
to have immunity to yellow fever, since the disease was not endemic in the highlands. These 
“non-immunes” were viewed by RF officials as a major factor in keeping the disease alive. 
Almost all of those who contracted yellow fever during the months of July and August 1918, 
were of highland origin, and had resided in Guayaquil only a few weeks or months. An official 
report noted: “Comparatively few Ecuadorians from the mountainous districts appear to live long 
in the coastal plains without contracting the disease.” 
A big problem was that many infected people experienced only mild symptoms, which 
they misdiagnosed as malarial fever, and did not seek treatment or enter quarantine. As a result 
they spread the disease from house to house and from town to town. This was attributed to 
migration practices. “There is a distinct tendency for Serranos to locate in certain rather definite 
houses run by their own town or distinct friends, prior to seeking quarter for themselves.” As a 
result, it was proposed that a core focus of the maintenance campaign be a systematic fumigation 
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in areas where non-immunes gathered, as well as “registration and daily medical observation of 
all non-immunes to detect early cases of acute infectious diseases that are suspicious.”8 
Given the context of the time, we can assume that most of these “serranos” were 
indigenous laborers. Although this was never made explicit, one of the key goals of the liberal 
state was to facilitate the movement of indigenous peoples from the highlands to the coast, and 
many agricultural workers were attracted by the promise of higher wages on the cocoa 
plantations that were booming in that period. In RF efforts to police communal housing, we can 
see racialized undertones developing that mirror those seen in Ecuadorian state efforts to 
challenge indigenous living customs as part of the process of modernization.
9
 In this sense, RF 
and state policy existed in mutual intersection. Both were racialized in a subtle way, 
problematizing indigenous practices for the threat they posed to the processes of modernization, 
even as they served in other ways to create a platform for enhanced Indian participation in 
national life.  
This case-study is also telling, because it makes clear that although yellow fever was 
fully eliminated in Guayaquil, facilitating foreign trade and the opening of the port, it remained a 
serious and ongoing problem in other parts of Ecuador. Most notable were the repeated 
outbreaks in the Amazon, an area which continued to be racked by the disease. However, reports 
of outbreaks failed to pique RF interest, perhaps because the majority of victims were lowland 
Indians.  
RF correspondence reveals that frequent notifications were presented about the problem 
of yellow fever in the Amazon. One particularly detailed account came in 1936 when the Science 
Service in Washington D.C. forwarded information received from an archeologist who had been 
on an expedition in Ecuador the previous year, and thought the RF might be interested in the 
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prevalence of yellow fever he encountered during his travels in the province of Oriente. The 
archeologist wrote that between April and October 1935 he witnessed an intense yellow fever 
epidemic on the Anzu River, one day’s journey above Napo. As the Science Service surmised: 
“The Indians in the location were dying off to the extent that no labor was available there 
anymore, and he had to abandon his expedition because he could not get any Indian porters.”10 A 
description was provided of the symptoms of the disease, called the “3-day” disease by the 
Indians, because death followed on the third day following the initial symptom of a severe 
headache, followed by additional symptoms including a high fever and green or black vomiting. 
The outbreak occurred in a part of the Amazon previously considered to be exceedingly healthy.  
The archeologist reported that quinine did not help sufferers of the disease, and no other 
medicines were available.  
Concern was expressed that because the Ecuadorian government had been intensifying its 
military presence in the area troops might contract the disease and spread it to other parts of 
Ecuador.
11
 However, the letter prompted no reply or follow-up correspondence, suggesting that 
at this point an outbreak that concerned only Amazonian Indians was not considered a priority to 
the RF.   
The following year the RF representative on the ground urged New York based officials 
to act on the Amazonian outbreak, writing that there was so much yellow fever virus scattered 
around the Amazonian jungle districts that “we must, sooner or later, expect the appearance of 
the disease in any unprotected city.” 12 However, the response from higher ranking personnel 
was that:  “It is no part of the Foundation’s program to become permanently involved with the 
administration of the anti-mosquito service and only under exceptional emergency conditions of 
a temporary character, can we expect to secure provisions for the organization of anti-aegypti 
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work.” Instead, “every effort is being made to induce the individual governments to undertake 
the organization of the anti-mosquito service in all the important cities and parts of South 
America.”13 Perhaps because the disease was affecting mainly Amazonian indigenous groups—
not a constituency that greatly affected U.S. economic interests— no action was taken and the 
Amazonian yellow fever outbreak continued unchecked.   
With regards to indigenous realities, then, we see significant convergence between the 
policies of the RF and the Ecuadorian state in terms of the spatialization of public health 
provisions. Highland Indians were seen as problematic but important; Amazonian Indians were 
viewed as less of a priority. When we examine attitudes to Afro-Ecuadorians, the situation was 
slightly different. The primarily Afro-Ecuadorian province of Esmeraldas was the most neglected 
within Ecuadorian state policy, and I have argued in the past that this reflected anti-black racism, 
and a conviction on the part of national elites that Afro-Ecuadorians lacked the mutability and 
transformability that made indigenous peoples candidates for the future extension of 
citizenship.
14
  
However, this exclusion was not reflected in RF policy in Ecuador.  Although efforts to 
establish a hookworm eradication program in Esmeraldas, as an extension of the 1916-1918 
yellow fever eradication program in Guayaquil did not come to fruition,
15
 RF interest in the 
province expanded as the primary extraction sector in Esmeraldas became increasingly 
dominated by American capital in the 1940s. The rubber boom sparked by WW II was followed 
by the massive postwar expansion of the banana sector as the United Fruit Company established 
holdings in Esmeraldas. This was accompanied by increased attention from international 
agencies. In 1943, after an RF survey found that there was only one trained doctor in the entire 
province of Esmeraldas, as compared to ninety in the city of Guayaquil alone, plans were 
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proposed to establish a new IIAA-funded hospital and clinic in the city of Esmeraldas, for the 
benefit of rubber workers.
16
  
In April 1948, Dr. Glenn Curtis was appointed leader of the expedition, and took a four 
day trip to Esmeraldas, “accomplished by jeep, burro-back, hiking through the jungle, and one 
full day in a dugout canoe”—the lack of more modern transportation, a marker of  state neglect 
and lack of government funding. Curtis was moved by conditions in the town of Quinindé, where 
the only health service was a young man with three months of medical training trying to serve a 
population of two to three thousand people, supplied only with boiling water. “It is surprising 
how much this boy is accomplishing with this simple remedy.” The city of Esmeraldas took ten 
and a half hours, in a dugout canoe, to reach. This provincial capital had a population of twelve 
thousand people, but the water supply was not functioning because the state-funded treatment 
plant was not adequate and had not been effectively operating for years. “The only sewers we 
could see were in the windows … the hospital consists of a wooden framed building that is 
certainly inadequate for their needs.” Supplies were desperately needed to treat snakebite, 
malaria and tropical ulcers, but the most prominent public health threat was considered to be 
yaws. “This is the most dangerous and extensive plague in all of the province.”17  The RF’s 
commitment to funding a yaws eradication campaign, in conjunction with the IIAA hospital, had 
a positive impact on modernizing healthcare in the province.  
Notably, unlike in Ecuadorian policy discussions pertaining to Esmeraldas, at no time 
was the race of the inhabitants noted in any RF correspondence. While blackness was considered 
a salient and concerning category for national officials, this was not the case with regards to the 
RF, who were motivated primarily by the need to protect and facilitate American investments in 
the rubber and banana industry and related strategic interests.   
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Gender, Domesticity and the Rockefeller Nursing School 
One of the difficulties of examining the racialization of RF policy is that it is challenging 
to gain more than a limited sense of how black and indigenous people responded to the ideas and 
strategies implemented. When examining gender, it is much easier to assess a women’s 
agency—at least those of the middle and upper classes—in negotiating the norms and ideals laid 
out by official policy. In exploring the intersection between gender and RF goals and actions, it 
is important to note that RF activities followed a somewhat different path from those we 
conventionally associate with the gendering of public health. RF actions were directed primarily 
towards initiatives that would enhance the smooth operating of American capital, and it 
sponsored no projects specifically aimed at mother and baby care, or the eradication of venereal 
disease, or the registration of prostitution, or any of those other activities which a wave of recent 
research on gender and state formation in Latin America has directed our attention to.
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However, the centrality of ideas about domesticity and the home to RF ideas about public health 
in Ecuador can be clearly seen in the controversies and debates surrounding the School for 
Nursing in Quito that was established with RF funding and in partnership with the Pan-American 
Sanitary Bureau and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.  
This was one of the major investments that the RF made in Ecuador, and the school faced 
many problems over its lifespan, including delays in construction, a lack of “modern equipment” 
in Quito hospitals, the resistance of Quito doctors to work with RF trainee nurses, and the 
inability of the Ecuadorian state to provide the necessary financial resources to bridge the gap in 
funding. However, perhaps the biggest problem was the challenge the nursing school faced in 
convincing the Ecuadorian elites and middle classes that nursing was a respectable occupation 
for their daughters.  The school faced a chronic shortage of students, and this ultimately 
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undermined the long-term development of the facility, because there was a lack of candidates to 
send on fellowship in the U.S. that was perceived to be an essential precursor to Ecuadorian 
women running the institution. These problems stemmed from and reflected dueling visions of 
domesticity: an American image in which the domestic was moved into the public realm, and a 
national one, where this extension of domestic duties beyond the private space of the home had 
negative class and race connotations.  
In a revealing letter to the head of RF nursing operations in Latin America, an Ecuadorian 
doctor on a RF fellowship at Johns Hopkins, Dr. Juan A. Montalván, alerted Mary Tennant to the 
problems the school would face and described attitudes towards nursing in Ecuador. “The 
nursing profession has no prestige whatever in my country. No capable or ambitious person 
considers nursing because it has become customary to call any woman who is employed in a 
clinic or hospital and who wears a white dress a nurse.”19 Thus the problem for him was the class 
status of most of the women classified as nurses, and while the only way to professionalize them 
was to improve the backgrounds of practitioners, this would be a major challenge given the 
attitudes of the “respectable” classes.  
This idea of “improvement” in the class status of nurse practitioners was a core focus of 
early efforts of the RF and their partners, even before the school was officially established. The 
first task of the two American nurses sent to establish the school, Anne Cacioppo and Berta 
Maura Marsch, was to win the “confidence and the friendship of the leading citizens of 
Ecuador.” Their efforts were praised by the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, which reported in 
1942, “They have aroused an interest in nursing among a higher type of candidate than has 
hitherto been known in South America.”20 
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However, it seems that RF concern for the class and race status of their students 
undermined their mandate of creating a fully national institution. The Ecuadorian government 
provided scholarships for two girls from each of the nine provinces, with the intention that the 
school would therefore create trained public health personnel which could benefit the population 
as a whole.
21
 Yet, the school consistently struggled to find girls from provinces outside of Guyas 
and Quito—the two most urban and reliably white-mestizo areas—and scholarships from other, 
more rural provinces, where the population was more ethnically diverse routinely went unfilled. 
This reflected a policy of selecting all candidates from the ‘escuelas superiors,’ which was 
designed to “insure an intelligent student, with an education corresponding to high school or 
junior college in the U.S.”22 However, there were no escuela superiors—certainly not for girls—
in many of the more rural provinces, undermining any effort to recruit from those areas. In 1948, 
under government pressure, one of the American nurses, Miss Surrette, canvassed rural Ecuador 
to try to find students, and succeeded in finding between seventy and eighty girls with some 
secondary education.
23
 However, she expressed concerns about the “quality” of these 
candidates—almost certainly a veiled class/race comment—and ultimately only a handful of 
these girls were enrolled. When they graduated, the American school heads refused to fulfill their 
agreement with the government which stipulated that upon graduation the girls would go back to 
their province of origin to train nurses in their local hospitals, insisting that conditions were too 
“backwards” and would overwhelm any single nurse. It is likely that it was not simply hospital 
conditions that she was referencing with this comment.  
Class and ethnic concerns also shaped personnel selections for the school. An Ecuadorian 
nurse trained at the University of Chile nursing school was rejected despite her professional 
training and two years of experience working as a nurse in the public health program in 
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Valparaiso. The school head feared that she might not be accepted by the right circles in Ecuador 
because she came from a “poor family” and “probably has a great deal of Indian in her.”24 A 
similar veto was placed on a Puerto Rican applicant. Despite her Master’s Degree in Nutrition 
from the University of Chicago, the head of the nursing school, Dorothy Foley, rejected her 
application because “I feel a little skeptical about the ability of a Puerto Rican to manage this 
house, and I don’t like the idea of hiring a person sight unseen”25—apparently a veiled racial 
comment, as several other American nurses whose ethnicity was not opened to question had been 
hired that way. As a result of this focus on class and racial purity, the school was without a 
Spanish speaking nurse for the first three years of its existence, severely undermining the 
functioning of its operation, given that few of the students had any knowledge of English. 
Concerns about respectability also extended to recruitment of American staff. The hiring 
of a Mrs. Skelton, who had hospital experience in Central America and spoke Spanish, was 
vetoed because “her husband is a navy man … and she has a 17 month old baby.” 26 A working 
mother from a military family apparently did not project the image the nursing school wished to 
deploy.  
Tensions over what expectations could be considered respectable for young girls of the 
classes recruited were often filtered through religion and played out in conflicts with the nuns 
who had previously staffed most of the hospitals and who provided support services to the 
school. School leaders faced marked resistance from nuns over morality, religion, and the daily 
running of the school.  American nurses chafed at the expectation that students were expected to 
go to daily mass at 5 a.m., as well as to weekly confession, and resisted the nun’s expectations 
that they could review the content of student’s mail and telephone calls. Nuns often disagreed 
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with and ignored the rules and regulations set by faculty and sought to interject their own ideas 
on both curriculum and behavior.
27
  
Initially, the RF had also agreed to provide training for student nuns, but as tensions with 
the older nuns developed, the student nuns were dropped from the classes by the head of the 
school. This was partly in retaliation for the clashes, but also seemed to reflect deeper concerns 
about the appropriate level of modernity of the students in the class. In response to these actions, 
the Mother Superior removed all the nuns from the school, saying that the work the nuns were 
doing could be done by any hired person, and that they were needed elsewhere. 
28
 While they did 
quickly hire a new “house mother,” this did create problems with the parents of the students, and 
reinforced concerns about the respectability of the nursing school as an institution. Both parties 
resorted to sending letters home to the parents of the students. The nuns wrote that their 
withdrawal meant that the moral status of the girls was now in question, while the American 
nurses emphasized the “high social standing” of the new house mother, and the fact that she was 
both Ecuadorian and Catholic.
29
 
The nuns then sought to sabotage the nursing teachers and students on the wards, the one 
place where they continued to have contact, and doctors often sided with the nuns, and refused to 
allow them access to the operating room. Interestingly, this exclusion was framed in moral terms. 
The nursing school requested they be given sole access to their “own” OR, where their trainees 
could work with all the patients. Yet this was not approved because there were only four ORs—
one to be used only for women, one only for men, and the other two were reserved just for the 
“dirty” cases and were used only once or twice a week. (It was not clear in what sense the word 
dirty was being applied). Reserving one room for multi-sex, multi-purpose use by the nurses was 
presented as a threat to the morality of the patients, and the nun in charge of the ORs was the 
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main party responsible for the resistance.
30
 Eventually she was transferred because of her 
uncooperativeness, and replaced with a nun who had spent time in the U.S. and was therefore 
much more favorable to their needs.
31
   
Concerns around the respectability of nursing as a career path were also displayed in the 
publicity and tension generated by a series of scandals involving student conduct. A series of 
students were suspended for bad behavior, which was publicized in the local press. In November 
of 1945, Bertha Jarrin was suspended for three months for “un-chaperoned meetings” with young 
men.
32
 In the spring of 1946, another student, Leila Quimi, left the school to get married, 
apparently after becoming pregnant.
33
  
In 1947, a report by the Minister of Social Provision and Welfare, noted that the “moral 
and disciplinary tone” of the school was low, and suggested that it could be improved by taking 
control of both the school and boarding house out of the hands of the American nurses and 
returning it to the control of Ecuadorians.
34
 The RF’s nursing head retorted that: “There have 
been no scandals and only one suspected pregnancy, though much idle gossip. This is quite a 
record for a Latin American school, and compares well with the nun’s boarding schools in the 
United States. I feel that no American director worth her salt would try and shove the moral and 
disciplinary responsibility onto Ecuadorian housemothers, and no Ecuadorian parent would feel 
her daughter safe at this stage without an American in residence.”35   
Interestingly, given what we know about the focus on maternity and child-rearing in other 
areas of public health, the school explicitly rejected a focus on maternity, obstetrics and 
pediatrics. While trainee nurses were assigned to work at the local maternity hospital, the head of 
the school noted that, “We do not approve of Maternidad as a practice field, and we have little 
respect for the kind of work we have been able to do.”36 Likewise work on the pediatric ward 
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was discouraged because it would be “dangerous to the good name of the students and the 
school.”37  
While domestic ideals were firmly inscribed in the curriculum—in classes on dietetics 
and nutrition, the final exam was to “plan, prepare and serve” a complete dinner,38  and an effort 
was made to instill in the students “an evangelical urge about cleanliness.”39 The focus was on 
training women of the middle and upper classes to move beyond the home and therefore 
contribute to national development. It may be that a close focus on obstetrics and pediatrics was 
thought to impede this and ghettoize what was envisioned as an all-encompassing contribution to 
national health into the realm of a more traditional women’s sphere. Yet this may have been 
where Ecuadorian women felt more comfortable in their contribution. While the nursing school 
continued to struggle, and was ultimately replaced in the mid-1950s by one run by Ecuadorians, 
more conventional women’s volunteer projects, such as societies promoting care of infants, 
breast-feeding, and help for poor mothers, continued to flourish. The modernization and 
extension of women’s domestic contribution, encapsulated in the RF vision for the school, did 
not connect with the middle and upper class women’s own views of their roles.  
 
Conclusion 
An analysis of the activities of the RF in early and mid-twentieth century Ecuador reveals 
the importance of international actors to Latin American state-building, and also underlines how 
even slight differences between national and international discourses could affect the success of 
modernization projects in the fields of public health. In terms of racialization, we see a great deal 
of overlap between Ecuadorian and RF perceptions of race, and while this impacted the 
spatialization of health care projects, public policy goals remained largely aligned. The exception 
to this was in attitudes towards the province of Esmeraldas, which was a higher priority for the 
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RF than for the Ecuadorian state, for whom racial concerns continued to trump economic 
development demands. With regards to gender, there were more substantive differences between 
American and Ecuadorian norms, and this had consequences for the success of RF initiatives and 
provided slightly more space for negotiation and contestation by those who were the subjects of 
policy.  
These findings have wider resonance for our understanding of how the RF contributed to 
neocolonialism in Latin America, and steps forward recent suggestions that viewing the RF 
solely as an imperial agent may be too simplistic
40—attention must also be paid to the way in 
which the RF intersected with local demands and interests and contributed to the process of 
national-level state formation.   
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